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IMMIGRATION LAW 
SUMMARIES 
VIDES- VIDES v. INS: AN ALIEN'S BURDEN 
IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Vides- Vides v. INS, 1 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying petitioner's re-
quest for asylum.
' 
Petitioner, a citizen of EI Salvador, chal-
lenged the BIA's denial of asylum on grounds that his constitu-
tional due process rights were violated.' In upholding the denial 
of asylum, the Ninth Circuit relied on the "well-founded fear of 
persecution" standard of proof required for asylum, and the 
"clear probability of persecution" standard required for with-
holding of deportation.4 Although the BIA failed to explicitly 
state the distinctive standards, the court regarded this omission 
as a harmless error. II Mter holding that Vi des-Vides met neither 
1. 783 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986)(per Beezer, J.; the other panel members were An-
derson. J. and Brunetti, J.). 
2. Vide!- Vide., 783 F.2d at 1470. The term "asylum" has taken on catchall dimen-
siona with its use to describe three distinct categories in immigration law which provide 
procedural channela for persona fleeing persecution to enter or remain in the United 
States. Of the three, withholding of deportation, 8 U.s.C. §1253(h)(I982), and asylum 
status, 8 U.S.C. §1158(A)(1982) are both available to aliens already within the u.s. Refu-
gee status, 8 U.S.C. §1157(a)(1982) is available only to persons outside the United States. 
3. Vide!· Vidu, 783 F.2d at 1469. Although deportation was originally established as 
an administrative process with no provision for appeal, in 1961 Congress established a 
statutory right to review in the Federal Courts of Appeal. See 8 U.s.C. §l105a (1982); .ee 
a16o.Alternative! To Deportation: Relief Provi&iOn6 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, 8 U.C.D. L. Rev. 323, 326 (1975). 
4. Vide!· Vide!, 783 F'2d at 1467. 
5. Id. at 1468. 
117 
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standard, the court ruled that Vides-Vides' constitutional due 
process rights were not violated. e 
II. FACTS 
Vides-Vides entered the United States twice illegally, first 
in 1978, and again in 1980 after having been deported.? Deporta-
tion proceedings were instituted against Vides-Vides in 1984 .. 
Mter being given two postponements to obtain an attorney, Vi-
des-Vides appeared at his hearing without counsel, but ex-
pressed confusion as to why his Los Angeles attorney was not 
present in the EI Centro courtroom.' The immigration judge de-
termined that Vi des-Vides had had adequate time to find coun-
sel and proceeded with the hearing, giving Vides-Vides two 
weeks to file for asylum and withholding of deportation.10 Vides-
Vides' application was sent to the State Department, which ad-
vised the immigration judge that Vides-Vides had failed to es-
tablish a well-founded fear of persecution if he returned to EI 
Salvador.ll At the second deportation hearing, a new immigra-
tion judge, refused to reverse the denial of Vides-Vides' requests 
to transfer the case to Los Angeles and for another extension to 
obtain counseL 12 Consequently, Vides-Vides was left with no le-
gal representation at the hearing. 
Vides-Vides testified that he left El Salvador for fear of 
repercussions if he refused to join one of the groups engaged in 
civil war there. IS He articulated his desire to remain neutral in 
6. Id. at 1469. 
7. Id. at 1465. Vides-Vides was deported to EI Salvador in June 1979, where he 
remained for over a year before reentering the United States in October 1980. Id. 
8. Id. 
9.Id. 
10.Id. 
11. Id. at 1465. The Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanita-
rian Mairs, is required in withholding of deportation and political asylum proceedings 
to issue an advisory opinion concerning an alien's Application before an immigration 
judge can make a decision. 8 C.F.R. §§208.7, 205.10(b)(l985). 
12. Vides-Vides, 783 F.2d at 1469. 
13. Id. at 1465. Although the Ninth Circuit court made only cursory acknowledg-
ment of the strife raging in El Salvador, the U.S. District court in Orantes-Hemandez v. 
Smith 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982) elaborated on conditions in EI Savador which 
moot courts are reticent in discussing. The Orantes-Hemandes court took judicial notice 
of the following facts: (1) El Salvador is currently in the midst of a widespread civil war; 
(2) the continuing military actions by both government and insurgent forces create a 
substantial danger of violence to civilians residing in EI Salvador; and (3) both govern-
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the war as a political opinion upon which he based his applica-
tion for asylum. 14 
During questioning. Vides-Vides stated that he had never 
been personally persecuted by the military. but had been ap-
proached by a non-military group which invited him to attend 
its meetings.1II Vides-Vides also testified that he believed that 
his brother had been killed by the military - apparently for not 
belonging to any political organizations - and that Vides-Vides 
himself would be killed for the same reason.I4 But Vides-Vides 
was unable to substantiate the fact of his brother's death with 
any direct evidence. and did not produce the letter which he 
claimed detailed his brother's murder.17 
Although Vides-Vides sought asylum and withholding of de-
portation based on his fear of persecution for his political opin-
ion to remain neutral. both the immigration judge and. on ap-
peal. the BlA. denied his application. IS Vides-Vides then 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. I • 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Vides- Vides. the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA's denial 
of prohibition of deportation under the substantial evidence 
ment forces and guerillas have been responsible for political persecution and human 
rights violations in the form of unexplained disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture 
and murder. Orantes-Hernandez 541 F. Supp. at 358. 
14. Vides- Vides, 783 F.2d at 1466. 
15. Id. at 1465. 
16. Id. Although the concept that the Salvadoran military might kill someone for 
not joining a political organization might be a foreign one for the average U.S. citizen, it 
must be remembered that El Salvador is in the midst of a civil war. Males especially, 
who have not joined the military or para-military right wing groups, are often deemed 
suspect and potential guerillas. See generally, Salvadoran and Guatemalan Asylum 
Cases - A Practitioner's Guide to Representing Clients in Deportation Proceedings, Im-
migrant Legal Resource Center 1001 (1986). 
17. Vides- Vides at 1467. 
18. Id. at 1466. 
19. Id. The formal proceedings of deportation have mUltiple stages. See 8 C.F.R. 
§§242.1-.23 (1986). An immigration judge presides at the deportation hearing and the 
judge's decision is reviewable on appeal to the BIA. Review by the Board is the last 
administrative proceeding. Only after the alien has exhausted all administrative reme-
dies does a judicial review of deportation become available. 5 U.S.C. §§701-706 (Supp. III 
1986). 
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standard.20 The court held that substantial evidence supported 
the BIA's conclusion that Vides-Vides had failed to meet the 
clear probability of persecution standard under 8 U.S.C. 
§1253(h), for withholding of deportation.2l The Ninth Circuit, 
using the language in INS v. Stevic,22 reasoned that if an alien 
cannot show "that it is more likely than not" that he will suffer 
persecution, then he has failed to meet his burden of proof.2S 
The Ninth Circuit also upheld the BIA's finding that Vides-
Vides failed to meet the well-founded fear standard.24 Aahough 
the court noted that the BIA did not explicitly state that the 
asylum standard was more generous than the clear probability 
standard, it found this omission to be a harmless error.'11 Earlier 
in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS,2" the Ninth Circuit reversed a BIA 
denial of an alien's claim for asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion because the Board applied the incorrect legal standard.27 
The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed Cardoza-
Fonseca, holding that the two standards are indeed distinct .211 
In Vides- Vides, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its earlier 
holding in Bolanos-Hernandez v. IN828 that the well-founded 
20. Vides- Vides 783 F.2d at 1467. The substantial evidence standard is set forth in 
Garcia-Ramo$v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1985) and in Bolanos-Hernandezv. 
INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282 n.8 (9th Cir. 1985). 
21. Vides- Vides, 783 F.2d at 1467. 
22. 467 U.S. 407 (1984). The issues raised in Stevie were whether the Refugee Act of 
1980 had relaxed the clear probability standard with the anoption of the Protocol "refu-
gee" definition and, if so, what elements were necessary to prove a wel1-founded fear of 
persecution. The Court held that an alien seeking to Qualify for withholding of deporta-
tion must satisfy the clear probability of persecution standard. Id. 
23. Vides- Vides, 783 F.2d at 1467, (citing Stevie, 467 U.S. at 425). 
24. Vides- Vides, 783 F.2d at 1469. The Ninth Circuit has held that the wel1-founded 
fear standard required under the asylum statute, 8 U.S.C. §ll58(a), is distinct fom the 
clear probability standard necessary under the withholding statute, 8 U.S.C. 
§1253(h)(1982). 
25. Id. at 1468. 
26. 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd No. 85-782. 
27.Id. 
28. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca No. 85-782. In affirming Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court 
based its holding on the statutory interpretation of the two statutes and congressional 
intent. The more generous interpretation of the well-founded fear standard is derived 
from Congress' attempt to conform the definition of "refugee" to the United Nation's 
Protocol. Id. 
29. 767 F.2d 1277, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1984). Bolanos, a former right wing party mem-
ber, soldier and volunteer in the civilian police squad in EI Salvador, based his claims for 
political asylum on his feared persecution by guerillas whom he believed to have killed 
five of his friends and his brother. Id. at 1280. The Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's 
4
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fear standard is more generous than the clear probability stan-
dard.30 But even under what it articulated as a more relaxed 
standard, the court held Vides-Vides had failed to meet his bur-
den of proof.aI In fact, in dicta the court stated that Vides-Vi-
des' petition could not be sustained under any relevant 
standard.u 
The court cited McMullen v. INs,aa reasoning that a case-
by-case analysis was required to evaluate Vides-Vides' appeal 
since each case had to be reviewed on its own merits to deter-
mine whether there was sufficient factual support and concrete 
evidence to establish that it was more likely than not that the 
alien would suffer persecution. N On this basis the Ninth Circuit 
held that Vides-Vides' testimony did not meet the requisite 
standard to show a clear probability of persecution. Since Vides-
Vides had never been "personally threatened, attacked, coerced, 
or persecuted", he failed to show he would be treated any differ-
ently than other residents of El Salvador." The court cited Cha-
vez v. INS" for the proposition that "[t]he tragic and wide-
spread danger of violence affecting all Salvadorans is not 
persecution. . . . "a7 
In its discussion of the well-founded fear standard, the 
denial of Bolanos' application for withholding of deportation and asylum and. in 80 do-
ing. found that the deaire to remain neutral Wall a political opinion for purpoees of a 
statutory bar to deportation. Id. at 1286. 
30. In Bolanoa-Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit relied on Stevie dicta that the well-
founded fear standard Wall "more generoua" and "more liberal • . • than the clear 
probability teat." Stevie; 467 U.s. at 425. 
31. Videa- Videa. 783 F.2d at 1468. 
32. Id. The court, in discuaaing the BINs recognition of distinctive standards which 
could be relevant in adjudicating claims of persecution under the two statutes, stated 
"(tlhe BIA then concluded that Videa-Videa petition could not be sustained under any 
relevant standard. We agree." Id. at 1468-69. 
33. 658 F.2d 1312. 1317 (9th Cir. 1981) rev'd on other grouruU at 788 F.2d 591 (9tl: 
Cir. 1986) (McMullen. a former member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army who 
feared persecution and poaaible execution by the PIRA for refusing to carry out the kid-
napping of an American bar owner, Wall round by the Ninth Circuit to have demon-
strated an adequata showing of probable persecution to avoid deportation). 
34. Videa-Videa, 783 F.2d at 1467 (citing McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1317). 
35. Videa- Videa, 783 F.2d at 1467. 
36. 723 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1984). (The Ninth Circuit rejected Chavez' argument 
that he faced persecution for being a young man unaffiliated with either the military or 
the guerrillas). 
37. Id. at 1433. 
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Ninth Circuit relied on Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS,38 which held 
that the standard has both a subjective and an objective compo-
nent.3~ In Diaz-Escobar v. INS,40 the court explained that the 
subjective component requires that the petitioner show that his 
fear is genuine.41 The Ninth Circuit admitted that Vides-Vi des' 
testimony "makes it clear that he is in fact afraid to return to EI 
Salvador", thereby meeting the subjective fear requirement.4J 
But the court added that Vides-Vides' fear also had to be sub-
jectively genuine and objectively reasonable. The court again 
cited Diaz-Escobar, stating that the objective component would 
be met by a showing of "credible, direct, and specific evidence" 
which showed an alien's fear of persecution to be reasonable.41 
Since Vides-Vides had not been individually threatened because 
of his political opinion, the Ninth Circuit found that Vides-Vi-
des had not proved that he would be singled out for persecution 
and had therefore failed to establish the "objective" component 
of the well-founded fear of persecution test." 
Addressing Vi des-Vides' contentions that his due process 
rights were violated, the Ninth Circuit first discussed the substi-
tution of the new immigration judge at the asylum hearing. The 
court reasoned that since the new immigration judge summa-
rized the events of the first hearing, he was in fact familiar with 
the record and it was therefore harmless errOl" that the judge 
failed to explicitly state that he was familiarized with the rec-
ord.411 No prejudice to Vides-Vides could be discerned in the rec-
38. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS 777 F.2d at 513. Hernandez-Ortiz, a Salvadoran citizen 
sought asylum in the United States hoping to avoid the government violence that had 
already been directed against her family. The Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's denial to 
reopen deportation proceedings, holding the BIA abused its discretion in finding Her-
nandez-Ortiz had not made a prima facie showing of persecution after petitioner told of 
her brother and sister-in-law's murder at the hands of the Salvadoran security forces. Id. 
She also testified that soldiers robbed her grandparent's grocery store, threatening them 
with machine guns, and that her brother-in-law's wife was kidnapped by the National 
Guard who "beat her and threw salt and sand in her eyes." Id. at 512. 
39.Id. 
40. 788 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). The court found that Dial-Escobar had not ade-
quately shown that he faced persecution in Guatemala with his testimony about a 
threatening letter left on his car warning him to leave the country or be subject to the 
consequences. Id. at 1490. 
41.Id. 
42. Vider-Videa, 783 F.2d at 1469. 
43. Id. (citing Diaz-Escobar, 788 F.2d at 1488). 
44. Videa- Videa, 783 F.2d at 1469. 
45. Id. See 8 C.F.R. §242.3(b). 
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ord from the new immigration judge's failure to reverse earlier 
rulings.·8 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since the first judge 
had already denied Vides-Vides' requests to transfer the case to 
Los Angeles and to continue the case so he could obtain an at-
torney, there was no prejudice caused by the substitution of 
judges.·? Moreover, the court found that the original judge had 
done everything he reasonably could to allow Vides-Vides to get 
an attorney.48 
Relying on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza;i the court explained 
that because deportation is "purely a civil action" there is no 
sixth amendment right to appointed counsel and thus Vi des-Vi-
des' lack of counsel at the hearings was not a violation of due 
process.IIO The court concluded its discussion by stating that Vi-
des-Vides in his appeal had not introduced any new evidence 
which an attorney would have discovered and presented at the 
hearing. III 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Vides- Vides is significant in that the Ninth Circuit found 
that the BIA did not explicitly state that the well-founded fear 
standard for asylum was more generous than the clear 
probability standard for withholding, yet found that this omis-
sion was harmless error. This is an apparent limitation of the 
Cardoza-Fonseca rule requiring reversals of BIA decisions where 
the Board has incorrectly applied the standards. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's delineation in Vides- Vides will be important to future asy-
lum applicants, especially those whose applications might pass 
46. Vides- Vides, 783 F.2d at 1469. 
47. [d. 
48. [d. 
49. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
SO. Lopez-Mendoza focuses on the exclusionary rule and unlawful arrest. The Su-
preme Court held: 
A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine 
a person's eligibility to remain in this country. The purpose of 
deportation is not to punish past transgressions but rather to 
put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws. 
Consistent with the civil nature of a deportation proceeding, 
various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial 
do not apply in a deportation hearing. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1032. 
51. Vides- Vides, 783 F.2d at 1470. 
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muster under the well-founded fear standard but not under the 
deRcf probability standard. 
Vides- Vides also highlighted the evidentiary plight of asy-
lUi!: seekers. Moreover, Vides-Vides raised the question of 
whether an alien is deprived of due process by not being guaran-
teed counsel in a deportation/asylum context. These were Vides-
Vides' most vulnerable contentions in his appeal, and unless lib-
eral changes are made in asylum law, asylum seekers in the fu-
ture will continue to be constrained by these fundamental limi-
tations in deportation proceedings. 
Louise E. Garrison· 
PANGILINAN v. INS: WAITING THIRTY 
YEARS FOR CITIZENSHIP 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Pangilinan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,! 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the denial of nat-
uralization petitions of 15 Filipino war veterans who were eligi-
ble for U.S. citizenship under a post-World War II act of Con-
gress.:I The court initially held that the issues presented were 
justiciable, and not political. a The court found that the Attorney 
General had exceeded his authority in making it administra-
tively impossible for the petitioners to petition for naturaliza-
tion.· The court then eX0rcised its powers in equity and granted 
petitioners United States citizenship. & 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988 
1. 796 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1986) (per Norris. J.; the other panel members were 
Sehroeder, J., and Fletcher, J.). 
2. Id. at 1103. 
3. Id. at 1096. 
4. Id. at 1102. 
5. Id. at 1102·03. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In March 1942, Congress amended the Nationality Act of 
1940 to make it easier for all non-citizens who served honorably 
in the United States armed forces to become American citizens! 
Non-citizen servicemembers were exempted from certain natu-
ralization requirements such as the five-year residency require-
ment in the United States, the requirement to be proficient in 
the English language, and the mandate that only U.S. courts 
could perform the naturalization.7 World War II veterans had 
between August 1946 and December 31, 1946 to petition for nat-
uralization under these relaxed standards. a 
Congress permitted any representative of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) designated by the Attorney 
General to natualize citizens outside the United States.' In the 
Philippine Islands, the Vice Consul in Manila was so designated 
in August 1945.10 For political reasons, the Attorney General re-
voked the Vice Consul's naturalization authority in October 
1945.11 Philippine officials had expressed concern that many ser-
vicemembers would depart to the United States leaving the 
Philippine Islands with insufficient manpower on the eve of 
their independence.12 
In Pangilinan, the court consolidated the appeals of 15 Fili-
pino veterans whose naturalization petitions were denied by the 
district courts on the ground that they were filed after the De-
6. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 701-05, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), 
amended by Second War Powers Act § 1001, Pub. L. No. 77-507, 56 Stat. 182 (1942) 
("1940 Act"). Congress provided (1) that non-citizens who served honorably in the mili-
tary forces of the United States during World War II could be naturalized if they met 
liberalized standards, § 701; (2) that any such person serving abroad may be naturalized 
outside of the United States, § 702; (3) that the petitions of such persons serving abroad 
"shall be made .•• and filed with, a representative of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service designated by the Commissioner," ld.; and (4) that the "Commissioner, with 
the approval of the Attorney General. shall prescribe and furnish such forms, and shall 
make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of 
this Act." § 705. 
7. Pangilinan, 796 F.2d at 1093. 
8. ld. at 1094. 
9. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
10. Pangilinan, 796 F.2d at 1093. 
n. ld. at 1093-94. 
12. ld. 
9
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cember 31, 1946 statutory deadline.13 All of the veterans were 
stationed in the Philippines during the nine-month period when 
there was no naturalizations examiner in the Philippines, but 
would have qualified for American citizenship under the 1940 
Act had they filed naturalization petitions before the cut-off 
date.H 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIMS WERE NOT BARRED 
The court first established jurisdiction by rejecting the gov-
ernment's argument that the appeals presented a non-justiciable 
political question.u Applying the standards enumerated by Jus-
tice Brennan in Baker v. Carr/fJ the court held that the ques-
tions raised by the petitioners were justiciable, not "political. "17 
The court found that the case involved questions of individual 
rights and a bona fide controversy as to whether a branch of 
government exceeded its constitutional authority.lS 
The INS argued that the lawsuits of the Filipino war veter-
ans were barred by section 310(e) of the 1952 Immigration and 
Nationality Act.1t The court admitted that Congress clearly in-
tended to foreclose future petitions under the less stringent re-
quirements of the 1940 Act. However, the court rejected this ar-
gument by finding no basis in logic or precedent for concluding 
that Congress intended to bar claims properly brought pursuant 
to the older statute.20 
13. Id. at 1094·95. 
14.ld. 
15. Id. at 1096. 
16. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The basic criteria for determining whether a question is 
"political" are (1) a "textually demonstrable" constitutional commitment of the issue to 
the political branches; (2) lack of manageable standards for judicial resolution; (3) a need 
for finality in the action of the political branches; and (4) difficulty or impossibility of 
devising effective judicial remedies. Id. at 217. 
17. Pangilinan, 796 F.2d at 1096. 
18.ld. 
19. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 310{e), 75 Stat. 656, 8 U.S.C. § 
1421(e) (1961). Section 310{e) required that all naturalization petitions be filed under the 
1952 Act, thereby closing the option of petitioning under the less stringent requirements 
of the 1940 Act. 
20. Pangilinan, 796 F.2d at 1096·97. 
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The INS next attempted to argue laches as a bar to the pe-
titioners' lawsuits. The court countered this argument by noting 
that the government failed to show that it was prejudiced by any 
lack of diligence by the veterans in pursuing their claims.21 
Finally, the court held that the Supreme Court's decision in 
INS v. Hibi21 did not apply. The petitioners here did not base 
their claims on the doctrine of equitable estoppel as had the pe-
titioners in Hibi. In the instant case, petitioners raised statutory 
and constitutional arguments not addressed by the Court in 
Hibi.S3 Stare decisis was thus held inapplicable.'· 
B. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL EXCEEDED HIS AUTHORITY 
Examining the words of section 705 of the 1940 Act,2G the 
Court found that Congress clearly mandated overseas naturaliza-
tion of non-citizen war veterans.sa Thus, the Attorney General's 
actions were in direct conflict with the will of Congress.27 The 
INS argued that the broad executive powers in the area of for-
eign affairs permitted the Attorney General to deny selectively 
the benefits of the 1940 Act. sa However, following the Supreme 
Court's analysis in Youngstown Sheet & Tu.be Co. v. Sawyer,U 
the court held that there was no inherent executive foreign af-
.fairs power that permitted that branch of government to over-
ride the expressed will of Congress.30 Further, because a "pre-
21. Id. at 1097. 
22. 414 U.S. 5 (1973). In Hibi, the Court held that the government's failure to advise 
a Filipino war veteran of his rights under the 1940 Act and to station a naturalization 
officer in the Philippines during 1945·46 did not rise to the level of affirmative miscon· 
duct sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable estuppel against the United States. 
23. Pangilinan, 796 F.2d at 1097. 
24. Id. 
25. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
26. Pangilinan, 796 F.2d at 1097, 1099-1100. 
27. Pangilinan, 796 F.2d at 1099-1100. 
28. Id. at 1098-
29. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). In the concurrence, Justice Jack-
son provided a three·part analysis of the extent of executive power. Where the executive 
branch acts with Congress' express or implied approval, executive power is at its zenith, 
and it is most likely that the executive action involved will be found constitutional At 
the other extreme, where the executive branch acts in opposition to the will of Congress. 
executive power is at its lowest ebb. The President can then only rely on his or her own 
constitutional powers minm any constitutional power of Congress over the matter. Id. at 
637-38-
30. Pangilinan, 796 F.2d at 1100. 
11
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cious right"31 was involved, any authority granted to the 
Attorney General must be construed narrowly.as 
Absent any broad delegation of discretionary authority to 
the Attorney General by Congress, the court held that the Attor-
ney General was expected to carry out the mandate of Congress 
even-handedly and without discrimination.33 The court found 
that the Attorney General failed to do so when he denied bene-
fits to Filipinos as a class.34 
The court concluded by stating that when the Attorney 
General has made it administratively impossible for persons to 
acquire the benefits stemming from their legal rights, he has ex-
ceeded the bounds of his legal authority.3& 
Using its powers as a court of equity, the court granted citi-
zenship to the 15 Filipino petitioners as the "only effective rem-
edy available."38 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Pangilinan, the Ninth Circuit rectified a situation that 
has caused extensive litigation. The court wisely based its deci-
sion on the clear and unambiguous language in the statute, thus 
avoiding a constitutional clash between Congress' exclusively 
vested naturalization pOWer1 and the executive branch's foreign 
affairs powers.38 
Jimmy L. Hom· 
31. Id. at 1101 (citing Kent v. Dullea, 357 U.S. 116, 128-29 (1958». 
32. Id. 
33.Id. 
34.Id. 
35. Id. at 1102. 
36. Pangilinan, 796 F.2d at 1103. 
37. See Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910) (the power of naturalization 
is vested exclusively in Congress). 
38. The court also avoided the constitutional equal protection question. See, e.g., In 
re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veteran&, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (ac-
tions of the Attorney General violated the equal protection rights of Filipino war 
veterans). 
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